hirasa
THE SECURITY DESIGN

Privacy deserves
a clear explanation.

Here’s what Hirasa does, what happens on your phone, and where its protection ends.

Independent audit status: Hirasa has not yet had an independent security audit. This page describes the app’s stated design, not an independent verification of its implementation.

One pattern. One vault.

Draw a pattern or type a passphrase. Each opens its own separate vault. There is no list of vaults to browse, and no “wrong pattern” screen: an unknown pattern simply shows an empty vault.

This lets you keep different parts of your life in separate spaces, without a visible directory of those spaces.

Encrypted before it’s stored.

Hirasa encrypts files, file names, and thumbnails on the phone before storing them. It uses ChaCha20-Poly1305, an encryption method that protects the contents and checks whether encrypted data has been altered.

The encryption key is derived from your pattern using Argon2id, combined with a secret held in the phone’s secure key storage (Android Keystore or iOS Keychain), which is hardware-backed on most modern phones. In plain terms, the pattern alone is not the whole key: the phone holds another essential part.

Your pattern + Argon2id + Phone key storage

That secret is designed to prevent someone from testing pattern guesses against files copied off the phone. This protection has limits, including a phone that is already unlocked and compromised.

No list or count of vaults.

The app keeps no record of how many vaults exist. Its key storage has a fixed size and is padded with decoys. The key storage does reveal an upper limit on how many vaults could exist, but not how many actually do.

In other words, the key-storage area is not a simple list that grows with every vault you create. This describes the key-storage design; it does not mean the app or the phone becomes invisible.

Decoys and duress are different.

A decoy vault destroys nothing.

Any second vault can serve as a decoy. Open it using its own pattern or passphrase. Opening that ordinary vault does not destroy other vaults.

Duress wipe is a destructive Pro option.

You can designate one vault so that opening it silently destroys every other vault on that phone . The designated vault is the one you open; the other vaults are the ones destroyed.

Know the boundary: duress wipe cannot reach encrypted backup files saved elsewhere, including exported files or backups in Google Drive. It is not a remote wipe of those copies.

Understand it before you enable it.

A sample-only simulation demonstrates a harmless decoy and a destructive duress wipe without changing real vaults. To enable a real duress vault, you acknowledge the consequences and reconfirm the current vault’s pattern or passphrase.

The real trigger remains silent. Opening the designated duress vault does not show a warning or offer an undo.

A way back, and its limits.

The recovery key

Each vault has a 32-character recovery key. It is shown when the vault is created and can be viewed again from that vault’s settings while the vault is open. Write it down and store it away from the phone. It can reopen the vault if you forget its pattern.

If you lose both your pattern or passphrase and the recovery key, access to that vault is gone for good. A recovery key is not a copy of your files.

Encrypted backups PRO

Export a vault as one encrypted file, or choose automatic encrypted backup to your own Google Drive. Google Drive backup is optional and only used if you turn it on.

Restoring is always free. Creating these encrypted backups is a Pro feature. Backup copies stored elsewhere remain outside the reach of duress wipe.

Check it. Then practice.

Before you add items to a new vault, Hirasa asks you to confirm a few characters from your written recovery key. This checks your written copy. It does not replace keeping the key somewhere safe.

A separate backup practice exercise encrypts and restores sample content in temporary storage. It does not touch real vaults or verify your own backup files, Google Drive, or restoration on another phone.

Backup status belongs to each vault.

The open vault shows its last completed backup, pending changes, and errors with a retry option. Automatic Google Drive backup runs only while that vault is open. Restoring requires the vault’s recovery key.

If Pro expires, existing files remain accessible for opening, exporting, and deletion. Restoring stays free. Automatic backup pauses while Pro is inactive.

Private sharing, even without internet.

The private beta adds direct delivery over a shared private IPv4 Wi-Fi network or a supported phone hotspot. Join the network manually, open Receive nearby, scan its temporary QR and compare all eight recipient-code groups before sending. Both apps must stay open. This does not implement NFC, Bluetooth pairing or automatic hotspot setup.

Encrypted before the connection.

Hirasa uses its existing X25519 receiving invitations and XChaCha20-Poly1305 secretstream packages. The local TCP transport carries encrypted packages, not plaintext files, names, vault keys or recovery keys. It does not use TLS; the package encryption provides content protection. Local network observers can see connection timing, size and a temporary upload capability. The capability limits unsolicited uploads; it is not sender authentication.

A short session. An explicit decision.

The nearby session expires after 10 minutes or after one completed upload. Leaving the receive screen, backgrounding or locking stops it. The underlying receiving invitation still lasts up to 24 hours and is consumed only on successful import. Incoming packages are verified before preview; the recipient must approve before files enter the vault. A delivery receipt is not proof of import or sender identity.

Limits remain 50 files and 512 MiB per package. Free vault capacity still applies. Guest-network isolation, VPNs, permissions and device/carrier hotspot support can affect connections. Two-phone Android/iPhone acceptance testing and independent security review are still pending. Copies kept by recipients cannot be recalled.

Cloud sync & backup status

Google Drive sync · beta

Optional sync uploads encrypted file blobs and encrypted manifests to your own Google Drive account. Manifests merge additions and retain deletion records so an offline device does not restore deleted items. Cloud blobs may remain after deletion; turning sync off or duress wiping does not erase remote copies. Google sign-in must be configured.

iCloud backup · not available yet

iCloud backup is planned and is not an available beta capability. Apple container configuration, an iCloud-enabled signed iPhone build, and real-device backup and restore verification remain pending. Do not rely on iCloud to protect or recover your Hirasa files at this stage.

The intended design writes encrypted .hirasa backup files to iCloud Drive, with upload scheduling controlled by Apple. These are design details, not a claim that the feature is ready.

For currently available recovery options, see Recovery & backup. Managed shared vaults are also not available: current transfers create recipient-owned copies without post-delivery revocation or open limits.

A camera that stays in the vault.

The in-app camera never touches the phone’s photo library. New captures made in the app do not pass through that library.

Imports leave the originals where they are.

Importing creates an encrypted copy in the vault. It does not remove the originals from your photo library or their original file location. Import results show what was added, what failed, and what was interrupted; those results stay encrypted in the vault until dismissed.

Review the results before managing originals yourself, including Recently Deleted and any cloud copies. Exporting items for use in another app creates decrypted copies outside the vault’s protection.

No account. No app analytics.

Hirasa has no accounts, email requirement, ads, or analytics. App network use includes app-store purchases, purchase verification, optional backup and device sync through your own Google Drive, and nearby local-network sharing when you start it. Nearby transfers use no Hirasa cloud relay or analytics SDK.

Privacy between visits.

Locking closes access to the active vault’s keys. A privacy cover hides content when the app is inactive and during the return transition.

Hirasa cleans up its temporary playback copies when the viewer closes and its temporary sharing copies on lock or launch, with cleanup also scheduled after sharing. Copies saved by another app are outside Hirasa’s control. This is not a guarantee of forensic erasure or protection on a compromised phone.

What it can’t do

  • Wipe backups elsewhere. Duress wipe only affects the other vaults on that phone. It cannot reach backup files saved elsewhere.
  • Recover a vault without a way in. Lose both the pattern or passphrase and the recovery key, and access to the vault is gone for good.
  • Protect an already compromised, unlocked phone. Encryption is not a substitute for a trustworthy device. Hirasa cannot protect a phone that is already unlocked and compromised.

Still have a question?

Contact support for help understanding the design. Never send your pattern, passphrase, recovery key, or private vault contents.